Democracies often find it strangely difficult to reorient themselves in such a way as to produce a change in government. Power alternates but even that often seems to depend on some exceptional circumstance, or a catastrophe. It often seems that the opposition has not so much won the elections as that the government has lost them, in a catastrophic way. Current affairs in themselves don’t seem enough to reveal the differences between political options, or to force a handover of power.
There may be a crisis here, affecting not just one country, but politics in general. Real social changes take place beyond political institutions, impelled by more or less extraordinary events. The opposition, any opposition, knows this and tries to further incite the turbulence. This, I think, has something to do with the current Socialist (PSOE)-Popular Party (PP) confrontation in Spain; there is a kind of logic in it that is worth the trouble trying to understand.
Let us look at some cases. After the recent hurricane in New Orleans, it was recalled that the floods of 1927 were decisive in bringing Huey Long to power in Louisiana, and Herbert Hoover to the White House. In 2002 in Germany, Chancellor Schröder reacted correctly to the floods, while his favored rival Stoiber went shooting, and lost the elections. Many other examples could be found. The way the government reacts to catastrophe is all-important.
German political scientist Carl Schmitt said that a sovereign can declare a state of emergency, suspending constitutional normality. It might better be said that he can exploit the state of emergency by reacting well to it. If we look at the things that excite the hottest political debate, we find catastrophic events such as forest fires, air accidents, floods and terrorist attacks, all of which cause the opposition to raise a howl. Whoever performs the thankless task of opposition knows that he or she has no better weapon at their disposal than a badly-managed catastrophe. This is his step up, the foot in the door. Governments understand this too, and prepare detailed plans for disasters so as not to give a chance to the opposition. Emergencies are now the stuff of political debate; routine business producing little political mileage, and left to the bureaucrats.
So what is to be done when there are no catastrophes happening? Well, they have to be invented. Even the mere suspicion of a catastrophe is enough. Much of the opposition’s work consists in altering the normal order of things, by insisting that this order has already been altered. For example, we are being asked to believe that the reform of the Catalan statute has a terrorist group behind it. A quite normal parliamentary procedure is said to be irregular, and is blocked. A demonstration is mounted in defense of the Constitution, as if it were truly threatened. Religion is trotted out on parade, as if it were about to be suppressed. The family is defended, as if it were about to disappear.
The government somewhat pathetically criticizes the opposition for trying to wear down the government – as if an opposition could be expected to do anything else. The system can easily put up with a bad opposition; more easily than its voters – the people whose interests it represents – can put up with it. A bad opposition hurts itself before it hurts the system, which has more patience than opposition voters. So the opposition must not only keep up the cry of catastrophe, but also its own credibility – two things which are not always easy to reconcile.
Any opposition runs the risk of confusing opposition with protest. This is what long condemned much of the left to a position of high principles but practical inability to transform society, and which might condemn the sociological right to a similar irrelevance. Not that I care particularly, but their voters are quick to worry. Anyone who intends to hold power cannot forget that the opposition is part of the system, and must be prepared not only to replace the government, but also to cooperate with it on occasions. This has a positive effect on the style of democratic debate. Catastrophic arguments focus on principles of morality, religion and identity; when you are so much in the right, who cares if you have a majority?
I might conclude this piece of unsolicited advice to the opposition with a little theory. Governing is something within the abilities of anyone; the hard thing is to be a good opposition. It is as leader of the opposition where you become believable as a leader of government. In the end, we voters think that the easier job can be done by one who has done the harder one. In other words, we are inclined to award the government to one who has performed the task of opposition.
